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1 Introduction
How does the value of life affect investments in life-contingent assets? Standard portfolio
choice theory with survival uncertainty, going back to Yaari (1965), usually sidesteps the
issue of the value of life by not requiring the agent’s utility when alive to be greater than
when he is dead.1 Empirical evidence shows, however, that people require substantial
compensation for an increase in mortality risk, implying that the value of life is large (see
Viscusi, 1993, for an extensive review). This, in turn, has dramatic effects on the welfare
assessment of issues involving changes in health and longevity (Murphy and Topel, 2006;
Hall and Jones, 2007).
Our goal in this paper is to analyze a portfolio choice problem in an environment where
life is valuable but survival is uncertain. Specifically, we study how explicitly incorporating
the value of life changes our understanding of consumers’ decisions to invest in assets with
survival-contingent payoffs such as annuities or life insurance.
The starting point of such an analysis is how to think about the utility of life. We take
a stand that this utility is an additional component to overall utility that depends only on
whether an individual is alive but not on his consumption, income, asset holding, etc. Put
differently, intra-period utility from being alive represents a non-pecuniary element of an
individuals’ welfare not captured by other pecuniary factors.2
In a standard additive expected utility framework, this non-pecuniary felicity from
being alive does not change consumption/savings decisions because it does not affect the
marginal utilities of consumption or wealth. However, this is not necessarily the case with
a more general preferences specification. In our analysis, we adopt a non-expected utility
framework (Kreps and Porteus, 1978). The attractive feature of these preferences is that
unlike the standard expected utility case, they allow to separately model aversion to risk
1In fact, in many parametrizations of such models, people have higher utility in the state of death. This
happens, for example, if utility over consumption is of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) type
with the coefficient of risk aversion set above one, and the utility in death is set equal to zero.
2In this approach, we follow Hall and Jones (2007). An alternative approach is to re-normalize disutility
from being dead instead of assuming extra utility from being alive. Rosen (1988) shows that these two
approaches are equivalent.
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and aversion to intertemporal substitution. This feature adds an important dimension
to the analysis: even though the utility from being alive does not affect the intra-period
marginal utility, it does introduce additional fluctuations in utility both over time and over
states of the world. This, in turn, matters for decisions of consumers who have different
attitudes towards these two types of fluctuations.
In this framework, we study how consumers allocate their investments between survival-
contingent assets. In the standard expected utility framework, the trade-off in this decision
depends on the marginal benefits of having additional resources in each state: marginal
utility of consumption if alive and marginal utility of bequests if dead. In the non-expected
utility case, there is an additional consideration, which, following Weil (1990), we call the
trade-off between safety and stability of utility. Importantly, each life-contingent asset can
potentially affect this trade-off in a different way.
We proceed in several steps. First, we provide a general characterization of how changes
in (intra-period) utility of being alive affect the relative benefits of allocating resources
to states when alive versus when dead. We derive conditions that determine the sign
of the corresponding change in annuity demand. We show that if agents are more (less)
averse to risk than to intertemporal fluctuations, annuity demand decreases (increases)
when intra-period utility of being alive increases. This happens because an increase in
intra-period utility from being alive increases differences in utilities both across states of
the world and over time. Annuity investments accentuate the former difference but can
smooth the latter.
Second, in the same general framework, we turn to the concept of the value of a statistical
life (VSL), which represents the willingness to pay to marginally reduce mortality risk
and is commonly used in the health and longevity literature (e.g., Cordoba and Ripoll,
2017). We show that the relationship between intra-period utility of being alive and VSL
is not necessarily positive. A negative relationship can arise when preferences are such
that intertemporal fluctuations are disliked more than risk. As mentioned above, this also
coincides with the situation where people invest more in annuities as intra-period utility of
being alive increases. Thus, when agents prefer stability over safety, the following somewhat
paradoxical result can arise: as felicity from being alive increases, people are willing to pay
less to extend their life, but at the same time they reallocate their portfolios towards assets
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that pay off only when they are alive.
Third, we apply our analysis to the parametrization of non-expected utility suggested
by Epstein and Zin (1989), and Weil (1990).3 We show that annuity demand decreases
(increases) with intra-period utility of being alive if the coefficient of relative risk aversion
is higher (lower) than the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (IES). Note
that the relationship between these two parameters determines agents’ attitudes toward
the timing of the resolution of uncertainty. Our result, thus, can be restated as follows:
when agents prefer early (late) resolution of uncertainty, they are less (more) interested in
annuities as intra-period utility of being alive increases.
In the final part of the paper, we provide a quantitative illustration of our theoretical
findings using a retirement saving model where agents have access to the private annuity
market. Using the distribution of retirees by wealth and pension income from the Health
and Retirement Study (HRS), we simulate how annuity demand changes with the value
of life. We show that if risk aversion is above the inverse of the IES, the percentage of
people buying annuities quickly decreases as the VSL increases. Moreover, the demand
for annuities is almost completely eliminated even for relatively low values of VSL. Put
differently, when people prefer early resolution of uncertainty, the low demand for annuities
can to a significant extent be accounted for by the fact that people derive utility from being
alive, and to arrive to this result we do not need unrealistically high values of VSL.
The last result offers important insight into the long-standing annuity puzzle. The
essence of this puzzle is that a standard life-cycle model predicts people should annuitize a
substantial fraction (if not all) of their wealth (Yaari, 1965), while in reality, the demand
for annuities is low. A number of explanations have been put forward to account for this
discrepancy. The prominent explanations include, for example, bequest motives, market
frictions, crowding out by Social Security, and high degree of impatience (Dushi and
Webb, 2004; Mitchell et al., 1999; Lockwood, 2012; Pashchenko, 2013; Pashchenko and
Porapakkarm, 2019). We explore another explanation for this puzzle. Specifically, we
show theoretically that demand for annuities is affected by the interplay between i) agents’
3This parametrization is commonly used in macroeconomics and finance, e.g., Guvenen, 2009; Inkman
et al., 2011; Kaplan and Violante, 2014; Krueger and Ludwig, 2019; Love, 2017.
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attitudes toward uncertainty and intertemporal fluctuations; and ii) intra-period utility
of being alive. Moreover, our simulations show that this mechanism is quantitatively
important.
From another angle, we can also say that in light of our findings, the low demand for
annuities can be considered as evidence that people prefer early resolution of uncertainty.
The issue of whether empirical evidence supports preferences for early or late resolution
of uncertainty is not entirely resolved. On the one hand, support for early resolution of
uncertainty comes from three sources. First are the direct estimates of the risk aversion
and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution from consumption data using an Euler
equation. These estimates find that the former exceeds the inverse of the latter (Attanasio
and Weber, 1989; Chen et al., 2013; Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio, 2003). Second are
the results from controlled experiments where people choose between different lotteries and
preferences are elicited from their choices. These experiments show that even though people
have heterogeneous preferences, on average they prefer early resolution (Brown and Kim,
2014; Meissner and Pfeiffer, 2018). Finally, studies in macro-finance show that in order
to account for a numbers of features of asset markets, such as the equity premium puzzle,
people should prefer early resolution of uncertainty (Bansal and Yaron, 2004; Huang and
Shaliastovich, 2013; Malloy et al., 2009; Yogo, 2006).
On the other hand, evidence that people may prefer late resolution of uncertainty comes
from studies in health economics. A number of studies in this field show that people
avoid learning about the true state of their health when it comes to serious illness (see,
for example, Oster et al., 2013 for the case of genetic testing for Huntington disease or
Kellerman et al., 2002 for HIV testing; see also Cordoba and Ripoll, 2017 for an excellent
review of such evidence).
It is important to mention our relationship to several strands of literature not discussed
above. Our paper belongs to a broad class of studies on saving and portfolio choice in the
presence of survival uncertainty. These studies can be divided into four groups based on
whether mortality is assumed to be exogenous or endogenous, and whether preferences are
standard additive expected utility or of a more general type.
The literature in the first category (exogenous mortality and standard preferences) is
very substantial and includes, among others, seminal work on saving behavior (Hubbard et
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al., 1994; De Nardi et al., 2010). As we mentioned earlier, these studies typically abstract
from the value of life; i.e., they do not impose a constraint that individuals are better off
being alive since, in the context of standard preferences and exogenous mortality, assuming
life is valuable usually does not add any new insights. One exception is De Nardi et
al. (2018) who explicitly incorporate the value of life in a structural consumption/saving
model with exogenous mortality in order to understand the non-pecuniary implications of
deteriorating health.
Among the literature in the second category (exogenous mortality and non-standard
preferences) it is more common to encounter studies that incorporate the value of life. This
happens because more general preferences oftentimes lead to non-trivial implications of
treating life as valuable. For example, Bommier and Villeneuve (2012) show that in a
model with standard preferences people are risk-neutral to mortality risk, and allowing for
non-additive preferences can introduce mortality risk aversion which is important to take
into account in many policy applications. Cordoba and Ripoll (2017) provide a detailed
illustration of the advantages of using a non-expected utility approach when modeling the
value of life.
In the last two categories of studies (with endogenous mortality) incorporating the
value of life is crucial because otherwise agents will deliberately increase their mortality. A
common approach in this literature, starting from the seminal work of Hall and Jones (2007),
is to add a constant to an otherwise standard utility function to ensure life is preferred to
death (Eslami and Karimi, 2019; Fonseca et al., 2020; Nygaard, 2019; Ozkan, 2017). An
alternative approach is to assume that death happens when health declines below a certain
level while assuming health enters the utility function as a necessary good (Yogo, 2016).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment and
derives our main results. Section 3 uses an Epstein-Zin-Weil parametrization to derive
restrictions on parameters that follow from our results. Section 4 provides a quantitative
illustration. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Model
We start by considering the demand for annuities in an environment with a general
preferences specification that allows us to separately characterize agents’ attitudes towards
fluctuations in utility across states of the world and over time. In the first step of our
analysis, we do not impose parametric assumptions on preferences but rather show how
demand for annuities depends on general properties of these preferences when individuals
derive utility from being alive.
2.1 Preferences
Consider an environment where agents’ preferences are characterized by a triple of
functions (w, f, g), where w(·) is the intra-period utility function, g(·) determines the
intertemporal aggregation rule and f(·) determines the uncertainty aggregation rule.
We assume that aggregation both over time and over states of the world has a form of
quasi-arithmetic mean. This can be defined as follows: the quasi-arithmetic mean of two
numbers x1 and x2 using function h(·), Mh, is:
Mh(x1, x2) = h
−1
[
γh(x1) + (1− γ)h(x2)
]
,
where h(·) is strictly monotone and 0 < γ < 1.4
Using this definition and denoting the value function of an agent at time t as Vt, we can
write the preferences in recursive form as follows:
Vt =Mg(w, zt+1) = g
−1
[
(1− β)g(w) + βg(zt+1)
]
,
where β is the discount factor and zt+1 is the certainty equivalent:
zt+1 =Mf (V
1
t+1, ..., V
I
t+1) = f
−1
[ I∑
i=1
pif(V
i
t+1)
]
Here, pi is the probability of outcome i next period resulting in the value function V
i
t+1,
i = 1, ..., I.
4Note that if γ =
1
2
and h(x) = x, Mh(x1, x2) is just an arithmetic mean.
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We assume that w(·) is continuous, and f(·) and g(·) are strictly increasing, concave
and twice continuously differentiable. 5
Before we proceed, it is important to note the followings regarding our preferences
structure. First, when f(·) = g(·), we are dealing with the standard expected utility case.
Second, when f(·) 6= g(·), we can disentangle agents’ attitudes towards inter- and intra-
temporal utility fluctuations. Specifically, an agent’s attitude toward utility fluctuations
over time is determined by the function g(·), while his attitude toward utility fluctuations
across states of the world is determined by the function f(·).6 Following Traeger (2014), we
can define the disentangled coefficient of relative risk aversion as:
RA(x) = −
∂2f(x)
∂x2
x,
and the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution as:
IES−1(x) = −
∂2g(x)
∂x2
x.
2.2 Portfolio choice problem
To illustrate how the value of life can affect demand for annuities, we incorporate the
preferences described above into a portfolio choice problem. There is only one type of
uncertainty, which is the uncertainty in survival: with probability st an agent is still alive in
period t+ 1 (conditional on being alive in period t), and with probability 1− st he is dead
in period t+ 1. Denote the corresponding value functions as V at+1 and V
d
t+1, respectively.
Assume that an agent can invest in two state-contingent assets. The first type of asset
delivers gross return Rat+1 next period if an agent is alive and nothing otherwise, while the
5As an example, consider two well-known parametrizations of the non-expected utility preferences
commonly used in macroeconomics and finance. The first is Epztein-Zin-Weil parametrization (discussed
in detail in Section 3), where both g(·) and f(·) are assumed to be constant elasticity of substitution
functions. The second is risk-sensitive preferences (Hansen and Sargent, 1995), where g(x) = x and
f(x) = −
1
k
exp(−kx).
6It is important to stress that g(·) determines an agent’s attitude toward intertemporal utility fluctuations.
His attitude toward intertemporal consumption fluctuations depends not only on g(·) but also on the
intra-period utility function w(·).
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second type of asset delivers gross return Rdt+1 only in the state when an agent is dead and
nothing otherwise.7 Denote the current holding of Type 1 assets as kat and of Type 2 assets
as kdt .
Note that if an agent does not place any value on having assets in the state when he is
dead, the portfolio choice problem becomes trivial as he will allocate 100% of his resources
to Type 1 assets. We assume that agents have a bequest motive; and we denote utility from
leaving a bequest in the amount kdt as ℧(k
d
t ), where ℧(·) is increasing and continuously
differentiable. We further assume that bequest is a luxury good, thus ℧(0) = ℧ > −∞.8
Denoting an agent’s time t consumption as ct, we can summarize the environment as
follows: if alive, an agent derives utility from consuming ct; otherwise, he enjoys utility
from leaving a bequest kdtR
d
t .
To ensure that a state when an agent is alive always brings higher utility than a state
when he is dead, we assume that being alive brings additional utility.9 We model this
additional utility by introducing a constant b, such that when b = 0, we go back to the
standard framework where life is not necessarily valuable, and ∂V at /∂b > 0, i.e., the higher
is b, the more valuable it is to be alive.
We specify the intra-period utility as follows:
w(·) =


ψ(ct, b) if an agent is alive in period t
℧(kdt ) otherwise
10
7The type 1 asset can be thought of as an annuity and the Type 2 asset as life insurance. A more
common approach in the literature is to study the demand for annuities in the environment when people
can invest in regular risk-free bonds as an alternative to annuity. Our results can easily be extended to
that framework as well (as we will show later); however, our specification allows for a clearer illustration.
8This assumption is common in the literature since otherwise even the poorest agents are compelled to
leave a bequest (see De Nardi, 2004).
9Note that without this assumption, it is not guaranteed that an agent who is alive has higher utility
than an agent who dies, i.e., life is not necessarily valuable. For example, assuming CRRA utility over
consumption and setting ℧ = 0, we have a situation where an agent who left no bequest has utility equal
to zero when he dies and negative utility when he is alive (assuming the coefficient of relative risk aversion
is greater than one).
10Note that the actual amount of bequeathed assets is kdtR
d
t . We omit R
d
t in the bequest function to
make notation less cumbersome.
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We assume that
∂g(ψ(ct, b))
∂ct
does not depend on b, i.e., the g-transformed marginal
utility of consumption does not depend on b. We will show below that this assumption
ensures that in the standard expected utility framework, parameter b does not affect
consumption/savings decisions.
Denoting per-period income of an agent as yt, we can write the individual’s optimization
problem as follows:
V at (k
a
t ) = max
ka
t+1
,kd
t+1
{
g−1
[
(1− β)g(ψ(ct, b)) + βg(zt+1)
]}
zt+1 = f
−1
[
stf(V
a
t+1(k
a
t+1)) + (1− st)f(V
d
t+1(k
d
t+1))
]
s.t ct + k
a
t+1 + k
d
t+1 = k
a
tR
a
t + yt
V dt (k
d
t ) = g
−1
[
(1− β)g(℧(kdt ))
]
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For the ease of exposition, we introduce the following notations:
ψ(ct, b) ≡ ψt, ℧(k
d
t ) ≡ ℧t,
stf(V
a
t+1(k
a
t+1)) + (1− st)f(V
d
t+1(k
d
t+1)) ≡ mt+1.
Using these notations, we can write the first-order conditions for the investments in kat+1
and kdt+1 as follows:
(1− β)
∂g(ψt)
∂ct
= β
∂g(zt+1)
∂zt+1
∂f−1(mt+1)
∂mt+1
st
∂f(V at+1)
∂V at+1
∂V at+1
∂kat+1
, (1)
(1− β)
∂g(ψt)
∂ct
= β
∂g(zt+1)
∂zt+1
∂f−1(mt+1)
∂mt+1
(1− st)
∂f(V dt+1)
∂V dt+1
∂V dt+1
∂kdt+1
. (2)
11We can also set V dt (k
d
t ) = ℧(k
d
t ), which will not change our results. We have chosen this formulation
for the sake of symmetry.
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We can use the envelop theorem to find ∂V at+1/∂k
a
t+1 and ∂V
d
t+1/∂k
d
t+1:
∂V at+1
∂kat+1
=
(1− β) ∂g(ψt+1)/∂ct+1 R
a
t+1
∂g
(
V at+1
)
/∂V at+1
, (3)
∂V dt+1
∂kdt+1
=
(1− β) ∂g(℧t+1)/∂k
d
t+1 R
d
t+1
∂g
(
V dt+1
)
/∂V dt+1
. (4)
Note that the left-hand sides of Equation (1) and Equation (2) are the marginal
costs of investing in kat+1 and k
d
t+1, respectively, while the right-hand sides represent the
corresponding marginal benefits. We denote these marginal benefits as MBat+1 and MB
d
t+1
for investment in kat+1 and k
d
t+1, respectively.
The key object of interest for our analysis is the ratio MBat+1/MB
d
t+1 since it determines
the relative demand for Type 1 and Type 2 assets. Using Equation (3) and Equation (4),
this ratio can be represented as follows:
MBat+1
MBdt+1
=
st
1− st
(
∂f(V at+1)/∂V
a
t+1
∂g(V at+1)/∂V
a
t+1
)
(
∂f(V dt+1)/∂V
d
t+1
∂g(V dt+1)/∂V
d
t+1
)
(
∂g(ψt+1)/∂ct+1
∂g(℧t+1)/∂kdt+1
)
Rat+1
Rdt+1
. (5)
Consider first the standard expected utility case where f(·) = g(·). In this case, the
ratio in Equation (5) reduces to:
MBat+1
MBdt+1
=
st
1− st
(
∂g(ψt+1)/∂ct+1
∂g(℧t+1)/∂kdt+1
)
Rat+1
Rdt+1
(6)
which is just the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption and bequests multiplied by the
ratio of expected returns of the two state-contingent assets.
Our key point of interest is how the ratio MBat+1/MB
d
t+1 changes when b increases, i.e.,
when being alive brings higher utility. If, for example, this ratio increases as b increases, the
marginal benefits of investing in the state when an individual is alive increases compared to
the marginal benefits of investing in the state when he is dead; thus, he shifts his investments
toward kat+1. If the opposite is true, an agent reallocates toward k
d
t+1 as b increases.
12
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Note that given our assumption that
∂g(ψt+1)
∂ct+1
does not depend on b, the ratio
MBat+1/MB
d
t+1 does not depend on b as well, and thus the demand for annuities and
portfolio allocation in general is independent of b in the expected utility framework.
Let us now return to a more general case of non-expected utility (f(·) 6= g(·)) and analyze
the ratio MBat+1/MB
d
t+1 given in Equation (5). To understand how this ratio changes with
b, we need to take the derivative. To make the analysis more transparent, we introduce the
following notations:
∂f(V at+1)
∂V at+1
≡ f ′a,
∂2f(V at+1)
∂(V at+1)
2
≡ f ′′a ,
∂g(V at+1)
∂V at+1
≡ g′a,
∂2g(V at+1)
∂(V at+1)
2
≡ g′′a ,
∂f(V dt+1)
∂V dt+1
≡ f ′d,
∂g(V dt+1)
∂V dt+1
≡ g′d,
st
1− st
(
∂g(ψt+1)/∂ct+1
∂g(℧t+1)/∂kdt+1
)
Rat+1
Rdt+1
≡ D.
Note that D is a positive constant that does not depend on b. Using these new notations,
we can write the derivative of the ratio MBat+1/MB
d
t+1 with respect to b as follows:
∂
∂b
(
MBat+1
MBdt+1
)
= D
g′d
f ′d
f ′a
g′a
1
(g′a)
2
∂V at+1
∂b
(
f ′′a
f ′a
−
g′′a
g′a
)
(7)
Note that the whole expression on the right-hand side before the bracket is positive:
D > 0; ∂V at+1/∂b > 0; in addition, the pairs (g
′
a, g
′
d) and (f
′
a, f
′
d) have the same sign because
of monotonicity of f(·) and g(·). Thus, the sign of ∂
∂b
(MBat+1/MB
d
t+1) is determined by the
expression in the bracket:
f ′′a
f ′a
−
g′′a
g′a
.
12Note that if instead of two state-contingent assets, we consider portfolio allocation between annuities and
regular bonds, we would consider the ratio: MBat+1/(MB
a
t+1 +MB
d
t+1), where the denominator represents
the marginal benefits of investing in bonds since they pay out both in states when an individual is alive
and not alive. Since this expression can be rewritten as 1/(1 +MBdt+1/MB
a
t+1), the ratio MB
a
t+1/MB
d
t+1 is
still our main object of interest determining the relative weight of annuities in the optimal portfolio.
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Given that both f(·) and g(·) are increasing and concave, both ratios
f ′′a
f ′a
and
g′′a
g′a
are
negative. As discussed earlier, these ratios can be thought of as measuring an agent’s
aversion to fluctuations in utility over states of the world and over time, respectively.
We consider two cases here. First, if
f ′′a
f ′a
−
g′′a
g′a
< 0, we can say f(·) is “more concave”
than g(·). In this case, an increase in b leads to more investments in kdt+1 and a decrease in
demand for annuities.
In contrast, when
f ′′a
f ′a
−
g′′a
g′a
> 0, g(·) is “more concave” than f(·) and an increase in b
leads to higher demand for annuities since MBat+1 increases relative to MB
d
t+1.
Thus, the relative concavity of f(·) versus g(·) determines whether an increase in intra-
period utility of being alive increases or decreases the demand for annuities. We discuss the
intuition behind this result in the next section.
2.3 Why does the relative concavity of f(·) and g(·) matter?
To better understand the results of the previous section, here we further discuss the
importance of the relative concavity of functions f(·) and g(·). Our focus is on how the
properties of these functions affect an agent’s decision of whether to allocate an extra dollar
of investment in kat+1 (and thus increase V
a
t+1) or in k
d
t+1 (and thus increase V
d
t+1).
To better illustrate the intuition, we consider two extreme cases which differ in whether
f(·) or g(·) is more concave. In the first case, we assume that g(·) is linear while maintaining
the assumption that f(·) is concave. In the second case, we assume that f(·) is linear and
only g(·) is concave.
2.3.1 Case 1: g(·) is linear and f(·) is concave
We can write the agent’s value function as follows:
V at = (1− β)ψt + βMf (V
a
t+1, V
d
t+1)
Note that as b increases, V at+1 increases while V
d
t+1 does not change. Since f(·) is concave,
the generalized f-mean Mf (·) puts higher weight on smaller outcomes. The increase in V
a
t+1
implies a decrease in its relative weight, i.e., its contribution to Mf (·) goes down. Thus, as
13
b increases, the shift in relative weight from V at+1 to V
d
t+1 makes investment in k
d
t+1 more
attractive.
More formally, using the assumption of the linearity of g(·), we can rewrite the ratio
MBat+1/MB
d
t+1 in Equation (5) as follows:
MBat+1
MBdt+1
=
st
1− st
(
∂f(V at+1)/∂V
a
t+1
∂f(V dt+1)/∂V
d
t+1
) (
∂g(ψt+1)/∂ct+1
∂g(℧t+1)/∂kdt+1
)
Rat+1
Rdt+1
Note that the only term in this expression that changes as b increases is ∂f(V at+1)/∂V
a
t+1.
Given the concavity of f(·), this term decreases as V at+1 increases.
Intuitively, the function f(·) determines an agent’s attitude toward fluctuations in utility
over states of the world. An increase in b widens the gap between V at+1 and V
d
t+1, so an
agent tries to reverse this by increasing the value of being dead V dt+1 through investments
in kdt+1.
2.3.2 Case 2: f(·) is linear and g(·) is concave
In this case, we can write the agent’s value function as follows:
V at =Mg(ψt, zt+1),
zt+1 = stMg(ψt+1, zt+2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
V at+1
+(1− st)V
d
t+1
Note that this time, because of the linearity of f(·), an increase in b does not change
the relative weight of V at+1 versus V
d
t+1 in forming the certainty equivalence zt+1. Instead,
and in contrast to the previous case, ψt+1 and zt+2 are combined non-linearly to form V
a
t+1
through the generalized g-mean Mg(·). In response to the increase in b, both ψt+1 and zt+2
increase, but the increase in zt+2 is larger because the increase in ψt+1 only reflects extra
utility from one additional year of life, while the increase in zt+2 reflects extra utility from
multiple future years of life. Thus, the relative weight of ψt+1 in V
a
t+1 (and hence in zt+1)
increases, making investments in kat+1 more attractive.
More formally, we can rewrite the ratio in Equation (5) as follows:
MBat+1
MBdt+1
=
st
1− st
(
∂g(V dt+1)/∂V
d
t+1
∂g(V at+1)/∂V
a
t+1
) (
∂g(ψt+1)/∂ct+1
∂g(℧t+1)/∂kdt+1
)
Rat+1
Rdt+1
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Note that the only term here that depends on b is ∂g(V at+1)/∂V
a
t+1, which decreases as b
increases, thus making the ratio larger.
Intuitively, the function g(·) determines an agent’s attitude toward utility fluctuations
over time, which is the only concern here given he is risk-neutral because of the linearity of
f(·). The increase in b disproportionately increases future continuation utility (represented
by zt+2) relative to the intra-period utility when alive (ψt+1). To bring them closer together,
an agent increases ψt+1 by investing in k
a
t+1.
2.4 The value of a statistical life
It is important to discuss how our analysis is related to the concept of the value of a
statistical life (VSL). The VSL represents a monetary value of a reduction in mortality risk
that would prevent one statistical death. More formally, it is the willingness to pay for a
marginal reduction in mortality risk, or the marginal rate of substitution between wealth
and survival probability (Andersson and Treich, 2011).
In our framework, it can be expressed as follows:
VSL =
∂V at /∂st
∂V at /∂k
a
t
(8)
For the ease of exposition and comparison with other studies, we are going to rewrite
the budget constraint in our optimization problem in terms of asset prices rather than asset
returns:
ct + p
a
t+1k
a
t+1 + p
d
t+1k
d
t+1 = yt + k
a
t (9)
Compared to the previous formulation, the return on assets is normalized to be equal to
one (conditional on surviving), while the price of the unit of assets kat+1 (k
d
t+1) costs p
a
t+1
(pdt+1).
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To derive ∂V at /∂st, we need to take into account that a change in st can potentially
affect the price of survival-contingent assets, i.e.,
∂pit+1
∂st
(i = a, d) can be nonzero.
13Assets prices and returns are linked as follows: pat+1 = 1/R
a
t+1 and p
d
t+1 = 1/R
d
t+1.
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Thus,
∂V at
∂st
= β
(
∂g(zt+1)/∂zt+1
∂f(zt+1)/∂zt+1
) (
f(V at+1)− f(V
d
t+1)
∂g(V at )/∂V
a
t
)
− (1− β)
∂g(ψt)
∂ct
[
kat+1
∂pat+1
∂st
+ kdt+1
∂pdt+1
∂st
]
∂g(V at )/∂V
a
t
(10)
Using the envelop condition, we can write the denominator of Equation (8) as follows:
∂V at
∂kat
= (1− β)
∂g(ψt)/∂ct
∂g(V at )/∂V
a
t
(11)
Thus,14
VSL =
β
1− β
(
∂g(zt+1)/∂zt+1
∂f(zt+1)/∂zt+1
) (
f(V at+1)− f(V
d
t+1)
(∂g(ψt)/∂ct)
)
− kat+1
∂pat+1
∂st
− kdt+1
∂pdt+1
∂st
(12)
Next, consider how VSL in our model changes with b, the additional utility of being
alive. Taking the derivative of Equation (12) with respect to b, we get:
∂VSL
∂b
=
β
1− β
st
∂g(ψt)/∂ct
(
∂g(zt+1)/∂zt+1
∂f(zt+1)/∂zt+1
)
∂f(V at+1)
∂V at+1
∂V at+1
∂b
×
{(
f(V at+1)− f(V
d
t+1)
∂f(zt+1)/∂zt+1
)[(
∂2g(zt+1)/∂z
2
t+1
∂g(zt+1)/∂zt+1
)
−
(
∂2f(zt+1)/∂z
2
t+1
∂f(zt+1)/∂zt+1
)]
+ 1
}
(13)
Similar to Equation (7) which determines whether the demand for annuities increases
or decreases in b, the sign of the expression above depends on:15[
∂2g(zt+1)/∂z
2
t+1
∂g(zt+1)/∂zt+1
−
∂2f(zt+1)/∂z
2
t+1
∂f(zt+1)/∂zt+1
]
,
i.e., the relative concavity of functions g(·) and f(·). When f(·) is more concave than
g(·), the expression in the square bracket is positive (since both
∂2g(zt+1)/∂z
2
t+1
∂g(zt+1)/∂zt+1
and
14This expression is similar to the VSL derived in Cordoba and Ripoll (2017) (Equation (17) in their
paper). In their framework, they assume V dt+1 = 0, f(x) = x
1−γ , g(x) = x1−σ, and ∂pat+1/∂st = δ/(1 + r),
where δ shows the degree of imperfection in the annuity market (with δ = 0 meaning the annuity market
does not exist) and (1 + r) is the gross return on a risk-free bond.
15Note that f(V at+1)− f(V
d
t+1) is positive because living is preferred to dying and f(·) is an increasing
function.
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∂2f(zt+1)/∂z
2
t+1
∂f(zt+1)/∂zt+1
are negative), thus ∂VSL/∂b > 0. In other words, the willingness to pay
to increase the survival probability increases as life brings more utility.
Note that this is not necessarily the case when g(·) is more concave than f(·). In this
situation, the expression in the square bracket is negative which can result in ∂VSL/∂b
being negative. In this case, as b increases, people may be willing to pay less to extend
their life.
To understand the intuition behind this result, recall that the concavity of g(·) determines
an agent’s attitude toward utility fluctuations over time, i.e., his aversion to the difference
between current utility ψt and the certainty equivalent of future utility zt+1. An increase in
b affects zt+1 more than ψt thus widening the gap between them - something an agent is
trying to avoid. Moreover, the higher is the survival probability st, the larger is the impact
of b on zt+1. Thus, when an agent’s dislike for utility fluctuations over time is very high, he
may be willing to pay less to increase st in order to smooth these fluctuations.
Importantly, a situation where g(·) is more concave than f(·) also corresponds to the
situation when demand for annuities increases as life becomes more valuable (b increases)
as was shown by our analysis above. Thus, in the situation where an increase in b makes an
agent less willing to pay for mortality reduction, he also has higher demand for annuities.16
In other words, when we disentangle an agent’s attitude towards inter- and intra-temporal
utility fluctuations, the following situation can arise: as life becomes more valuable, an
agent buys more annuities which further increases his utility when alive, while at the same
time, he is less willing to pay to increase his survival probability.
2.5 Extension: The case of irreversible annuity investment
In the portfolio choice problem we have considered so far, we assume that an annuity
pays out for one period: an agent, who, in period t, purchases an annuity gets paid only in
period t+ 1; to continue receiving an annuity payout in period t+ 2, he needs to purchase
an annuity again in period t+ 1. This is analogous to purchasing lifelong annuities, which
16Note, the opposite is not necessarily true. When g(·) is more concave than f(·), an agent’s demand for
annuities increases in b but his willingness to pay for mortality reduction can still be increasing in b. This
can be seen from Equation (13), which shows that ∂VSL/∂b can be positive in this case.
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can be freely adjusted both upwards and downwards every period. Annuities, however, can
represent an irreversible investment: if an agent holds annuities in the amount kat in period
t, he can only increase it.
To illustrate how modeling annuities as irreversible investments can affect our findings,
consider the following modified portfolio choice problem. We modify the budget constraint
in Equation (9) as follows:
ct + p˜
a
t+1(k
a
t+1 − k
a
t ) + p
d
t+1k
d
t+1 = yt + k
a
t ,
where the annuity price p˜at+1 takes into account the irreversibility, and is thus higher than
in the case we considered earlier.17 In addition, we must add another constraint to reflect
this irreversibility:
kat+1 ≥ k
a
t (14)
We denote the Lagrange multiplier on this constraint as µt.
Now consider two situations. First, suppose the constraint in Equation (14) is not
binding, then µt = 0 and our expression for MB
a
t+1/MB
d
t+1 is unchanged.
18 Thus, our
results carry through and the relative concavity of functions f(·) and g(·) determines
whether demand for annuities increases or decreases as life becomes more valuable.
Second, suppose the constraint in Equation (14) is binding, µt > 0. In this case, in
period t, an agent does not invest in annuities, thus at the optimum MBat+1 < MB
d
t+1. As
we established earlier, when g(·) is more concave than f(·), an increase in b (extra utility
from being alive) increases the demand for reversible (or liquid) annuities. This, however,
is not necessarily the case now: even though an increase in b increases MBat+1 relative to
MBdt+1, this may not be enough to induce an agent to start investing in annuities, i.e.,
MBat+1 can still be less than MB
d
t+1.
To summarize, when f(·) is more concave than g(·), the illiquidity of annuities does not
change the result that an increase in b decreases demand for annuities. When, however, g(·)
17Note that in this specification an agent who already has lifelong annuity income kat , adds k
a
t+1 − k
a
t to
it in period t.
18Since we have rewritten the budget constraint in terms of assets prices, the ratio Rat+1/R
d
t+1 in Equation
(5) is changed to pdt+1/p
a
t+1.
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is more concave than f(·), an increase in b either increases the demand for annuities or has
no effect on it.
Intuitively, as we discussed before, an increase in extra utility of being alive widens
the gap between instantaneous utility and continuation value. An agent with a strong
dislike for intertemporal utility fluctuations can partially offset this by purchasing reversible
annuities. However, irreversible annuity investments have much less effect on this gap in
utilities because they increase both instantaneous utility and continuation value given their
lifelong payout.
3 Illustration with Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences
A common parametrization of non-expected utility widely used in macroeconomics and
finance is to assume that both uncertainty and time aggregators are constant elasticity of
substitution (CES)-type functions. This parametrization was suggested by Epstein and
Zin (1989) and Weil (1990), and is referred in the literature as Epstein-Zin-Weil (EZW)
preferences. In this section, we reconsider our findings using EZW parametrization of
functions f(·) and g(·). We then derive the restrictions on parameters which produce
decreasing or increasing demand for annuities in response to higher utility of being alive (b).
We assume that:
f(x) =
x1−σ
1− σ
and:
g(x) =
x1−
1
α
1− 1
α
For the intra-period utility functions ψ(·) and ℧(·), we assume the following parametriza-
tion:
ψ(ct, b) =


[
ξcρt + (1− ξ)b
ρ
]1/ρ
if b > 0
ct if b = 0,
℧(kdt ) = η(ϕ+ k
d
tR
d
t )
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Note that when b = 0 and η = 0, we have standard EZW preferences. When ϕ = 0,
bequests become a necessity rather than a luxury.19 To maintain our assumption that
∂g(ψ(ct, b))
∂ct
does not depend on b, we set ρ = 1− 1/α.20
In this parametrization, the concavity of f(·) is characterized by the parameter σ, which
is also the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and the concavity of g(·) is characterized by
the parameter 1/α, which is also the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
α. In light of our earlier results, the relationship between these two parameters is important
for our subsequent analysis. Note that when σ = 1/α (and thus f(·) = g(·)), we are back
to the standard expected utility case.
We can now write the value functions as follows:
V at (k
a
t ) = max
ka
t+1
,kd
t+1
{
(1− β)
(
ξc
1− 1
α
t + (1− ξ)b
1− 1
α
)
+ βz
1− 1
α
t+1
} 1
1− 1
α
zt+1 =
{
st
[
V at+1(k
a
t+1)
]1−σ
+ (1− st)
[
V dt+1(k
d
t+1)
]1−σ} 11−σ
V dt (k
d
t ) =
{
(1− β)
[
η(ϕ+ kdtR
d
t )
]1− 1
α
} 1
1− 1
α
=
(
1− β
) 1
1− 1
α η(ϕ+ kdtR
d
t )
s.t. ct + k
a
t+1 + k
d
t+1 = k
a
tR
a
t + yt
Using the simplified notation introduced earlier and the envelop conditions, we can
write the first-order conditions as follows:
ξc
− 1
α
t = βm
1− 1
α
1−σ
−1
t+1 stξc
− 1
α
t+1R
a
t+1(V
a
t+1)
1
α
−σ (15)
ξc
− 1
α
t = βm
1− 1
α
1−σ
−1
t+1 (1− st)η
1− 1
α (ϕ+ kdt+1R
d
t+1)
− 1
αRdt+1(V
d
t+1)
1
α
−σ (16)
As before, denoting the right-hand sides of Equation (15) and Equation (16) as MBat+1
and MBdt+1, respectively, we can express the ratio of marginal benefits of investing in each
19In our parametrization of the bequest motive, we follow De Nardi (2004).
20Note that when ρ 6= 1− 1/α, the change in b affects marginal utility of consumption even in the case of
standard expected utility preferences.
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asset as follows:
MBat+1
MBdt+1
=
st
1− st
ξ
η1−
1
α
c
− 1
α
t+1(
ϕ+ kdt+1R
d
t+1
)− 1
α
Rat+1
Rdt+1
(
V at+1
) 1
α
−σ
(
V dt+1
) 1
α
−σ
(17)
Note that when 1α = σ, the last term in Equation (17) disappears and the relative
benefits of investing in two state-contingent assets are determined by the ratio of the
marginal utility of consumption to that of bequests. In this case, a change in b does not
affect annuity demand.
Next, consider the case when 1α 6= σ. The only term in Equation (17) that depends on
b is
(
V at+1
) 1
α
−σ
. Taking the derivative of this term with respect to b, we get:
( 1
α
− σ
)[(
V at+1
) 1
α
−σ−1
]
∂V at+1
∂b
The sign of this expression is determined by 1α − σ. When
1
α < σ, in response to an
increase in b, agents reallocate investments from kat+1 to k
d
t+1. This also corresponds to the
case when f(·) is more concave than g(·) and agents dislike uncertainty more than they
dislike intertemporal fluctuations. In contrast, when 1α > σ investments in k
a
t+1 increase as
b increases.
To summarize, when the coefficient of risk aversion is above (below) the inverse of the
IES, an increase in intra-period utility of being alive, b, leads to lower (higher) demand for
annuities.
4 Quantitative illustration: annuitization at retirement
In this section, we quantitatively solve a retirement saving model where retirees have
access to a private annuity market. The purpose of this exercise is twofold. First, we show
that utility of being alive in combination with preferences for early resolution of uncertainty
is quantitatively important in explaining the annuity puzzle. Second, we argue that low
annuity demand can be considered as an evidence that people have preferences for early
resolution of uncertainty.
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4.1 Setup
A retiree enters the model at time t = 1 with initial wealth k1 and pension income
n1, representing pre-existing annuity income provided by Social Security. At the start of
retirement, he chooses whether to acquire additional annuities through the private market,
i.e., whether to annuitize a part of his wealth k1. Starting from period t = 2 he only solves
a consumption/saving problem.21 We denote the annuity income of a retiree starting from
period t = 2 as n, where n = n1 +∆, and ∆ is newly acquired annuity income in period
t = 1. Note that annuity investments are irreversible, i.e., retirees receive ∆ every period as
long as they are alive. The price of annuity p˜a is determined as follows:
p˜a = γ
T−1∑
t=1
St+1|1
(1 + r)t
. (18)
Here St+1|1 is the probability an agent survives to age t+ 1 (t = 1, ..., T − 1) conditional
on being alive in period 1. It has the following relationship with per-period survival
probabilities st: Sj|1 = s2s3...sj.
We model two types of frictions in the private annuity market. First, there is a load
denoted as γ in Equation (18). It represents the discrepancy between the actual and
actuarially fair annuity prices for an individual with average mortality. It arises because of
administrative costs and adverse selection.
Second, there is a minimum purchase requirement, i.e., a retiree cannot buy an arbitrarily
small annuity income flow. This reflects an important feature of the market: insurance
companies usually put a restriction on minimum premiums for a life annuity. We denote
the minimum purchase requirement as n, thus ∆ ≥ n, and the minimum premium is np˜a.
4.2 Calibration
Retirees enter the model at the age of 65 (corresponding to t = 1) and can live at most
to age 95 (i.e., the maximum lifespan is T = 30). We use the Social Security life tables to
construct survival probabilities st, t = 1, ..., 30.
21Pashchenko (2013) proves that in a retirement saving model with no uncertainty (except for survival
uncertainty) an agent always chooses to annuitize only once in the first period.
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We take the initial distribution of retirees by total wealth and annuity income from
the Health and Retirement Study dataset (HRS). The HRS is a nationally representative
sample of individuals over the age of 50. We use the RAND Version P of this dataset. To
create the initial distribution we use retirees aged 64-66 in this dataset to increase the
number of observations. Initial wealth (k1) includes the value of housing and real estate,
vehicles, value of business, IRAs, Keoghs, stocks, bonds, checking, saving and money market
accounts, minus mortgages and other debts. Preexisting annuity income (n1) corresponds
to income from a Social Security pension.
We use the EZW parametrization of preferences described in Section 3. We assume
the following parameter values. To set risk aversion, IES, discount factor and bequest
parameters, we use parametrization from Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2019), who adjust
these parameters to match labor supply and saving behavior over the life-cycle. Specifically,
we set the discount factor β to 0.96, the risk aversion parameter σ to 4, and the IES
parameter α to 2/3. Note that in their estimation, risk aversion exceeds the inverse of the
IES. We also consider how our quantitative results change when the opposite is true.
We adjust bequest parameters so that the marginal propensity to bequeath (MPB)
and the bequest threshold in our model are equal to 0.97 and ✩3,600, respectively (values
estimated by Pashchenko and Porapakkarm, 2019). The threshold and the MPB can be
expressed as functions of parameters η and φ in a simple two-period consumption-savings
model (see De Nardi et al. (2010) and Pashchenko (2013) for more details). They have
the following interpretation: only people whose wealth is above the threshold will leave a
bequest (i.e., have an operational bequest motive) and 97 cents of every dollar above the
threshold will be considered as potential bequests.22 We set the weight of consumption in
the intra-period utility function ξ to 0.5.23
We set the load in annuity price γ to 1.1 based on the estimates of Mitchell et al. (1999).
Following Pashchenko (2013) we set the minimum purchase requirement n to ✩2,500. She
22The corresponding values of η and φ are 10−4 and 120, 000, respectively.
23Our results are robust to alternative values of this parameter. Changing the value of this parameter,
while keeping everything else the same, changes the MPB and bequest threshold. However, once other
parameters are adjusted to reset the MPB and threshold to the targeted values, the effect of the change in
ξ becomes insubstantial.
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shows that this number produces a minimum premium consistent with that set by large
insurance companies.
4.3 Results
Figure 1 displays the results of our simulations. The top panel shows the percentage
of individuals who purchase annuities at the beginning of retirement as a function of
intra-period utility of being alive (b), while the bottom panel shows the corresponding
change in the value of a statistical life (VSL).
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Figure 1: Annuity demand and the value of life when risk aversion is above 1/IES. Top panel: the
percentage of retirees buying annuities. Bottom panel: VSL in thousand of dollars.
When b is close to zero, almost 60% of retirees annuitize at least some part of their
wealth.24 This situation also corresponds to a negative VSL, i.e., the state of being alive is
valued less than the state of being dead. As b increases, the VSL increases, while at the
24In the canonical life-cycle model this number would be 100%. Our model, however, features several
impediments to annuitization; specifically, preannuitized wealth, market frictions, and bequest motives.
Note that despite all these impediments, more than half of retirees choose to annuitize.
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same time, demand for annuities goes down. The VSL becomes positive once b is close to 2,
and in this situation only around 10% of people buy annuities. Increasing b to around 6
almost entirely eliminates the demand for annuities. Note that the corresponding VSL is
less than ✩200K.
We consider next a situation when risk aversion is below the inverse of the IES. We
decrease the coefficient of risk aversion to 0.5 (compared to the benchmark value of 4),
which is now below 1/IES (equal to 0.67), while keeping all other parameters unchanged.
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Figure 2: Annuity demand and the value of life when risk aversion is below 1/IES. Top panel: the
percentage of retirees buying annuities. Bottom panel: VSL in thousands of dollars.
Figure 2 displays the results when using this new parametrization. The top panel
looks very different from the previous case: now when b is zero, no retirees buy annuities.
However, as b increases, more and more people start annuitizing. For example, when b is
close to 9, almost 40% of retirees purchase private annuities. This is in sharp contrast with
the previous case: when risk aversion was above 1/IES, a value of b close to 9 resulted in
zero annuity demand.25
25
To summarize, the results of this section reinforce our earlier conclusion: when we
disentangle an agent’s attitude toward risk and intertemporal fluctuations, utility of being
alive affects the demand annuities. Moreover, this mechanism is quantitatively important:
using the EZW parametrization with risk aversion exceeding the inverse of the IES, we show
that the demand for annuities is substantially lower when the VSL is positive compared to
the situation with the negative VSL.26, 27
4.4 Implications for the debate about early versus late resolution
of uncertainty
When people have standard additive expected utility they demonstrate indifference to
the timing of the resolution of uncertainty. In a simple two-period example this means they
are indifferent between two lotteries, A and B, that can be described as follows. Let both
lotteries have the same expected payoff. In lottery A, in the first period the outcomes for
both the current and future period are revealed, i.e., all uncertainty is resolved. In lottery
B, the outcome for the second period is not known until the second period arrives.28
In the case of non-expected utility, people are no longer indifferent between these two
lotteries. Specifically, in the case of EZW preferences, when risk aversion exceeds the inverse
of the IES, people are said to demonstrate preference for early resolution of uncertainty, i.e.,
in our example, lottery A brings higher ex-ante utility than lottery B. In contrast, when
25Note that VSL in the bottom panel of Figure 2 increases in b. This does not necessarily have to be the
case, as we demonstrated theoretically in Section 2.
26It is important to mention that empirical estimates of the VSL are typically above the value that
produces almost zero annuity demand in our simulations (which is less than ✩200K). Viscusi (1993) provides
an extensive review documenting that the estimates vary from ✩1 million to ✩16 million (in 1990 dollars).
US government agencies (Department of Transportation, Food and Drug Administration, Environmental
Protection Agency) use a VSL between ✩1-10 million in their analyses involving mortality risk (Robinson,
2007).
27Consistent with these results, Bommier et al. (2020) show that a quantitative model with risk-sensitive
preferences and positive VSL can be calibrated to match low annuity demand. Their calibration implies
preferences for early resolution of uncertainty.
28The comparison between the two lotteries is made under the assumption that people cannot do anything,
whether they know the outcomes early or not, i.e., they cannot re-optimize.
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risk aversion is below the inverse of the IES, late resolution of uncertainty is preferred, i.e.,
lottery B brings higher expected utility.
In this light, we can restate our finding as follows: when people prefer early resolution
of uncertainty, the annuity puzzle can to a significant degree be explained by the fact that
people value life. We argue that one reason why theoretical models starting with Yaari
(1965) consistently over-predict annuity demand is that in these models people are typically
indifferent to the timing of uncertainty resolution and do not necessarily prefer living to
dying.
A number of studies show that people are not indifferent to the timing of uncertainty
resolution, but the question of whether early or late resolution is preferred is not entirely
resolved. Three branches of literature discussed in the introduction provide evidence that
early resolution is preferred; specifically, studies that estimate an Euler equation using
consumption data, experimental studies and macro finance literature (e.g., Bansal and
Yaron, 2004; Brown and Kim, 2014; Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio, 2003). However,
there are some studies pointing in the other direction. In particular, several studies in
health economics suggest that people’s attitude towards testing for serious diseases may
signal preferences for late resolution (e.g., Oster et al., 2013).
This suggests another angle in which our results can be viewed. Specifically, we can
contribute to the debate on whether early or late resolution of uncertainty is preferred.
We show that one well-documented empirical fact (the VSL is high) can explain another
well-known empirical regularity (low demand for annuities) in a framework where early
resolution of uncertainty is preferred. Therefore we suggest that the annuity puzzle in
combination with the high VSL estimates can be considered as additional evidence that
people prefer early resolution of uncertainty.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the relationship between the value of life and the demand for
assets with survival-contingent payoffs. Two key features of our approach compared to
a standard portfolio choice problem with survival uncertainty is that i) we enforce the
restriction that living is preferred to dying by allowing for non-pecuniary utility of being
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alive, ii) we allow for a more general preference specification where attitudes towards risk
and intertemporal fluctuations can be separated.
We show theoretically that increasing non-pecuniary benefits from being alive can
increase or decrease the demand for annuities depending on whether people are more
averse to risk or to intertemporal fluctuations. When safety is of greater concern than
intertemporal stability, people buy less annuities when utility of being alive increases.
To illustrate this quantitatively, we use Epstein-Zin-Weil parametrization of preferences
and simulate annuity demand in a retirement saving models using the data from the HRS.
We show that when risk aversion exceeds the inverse of the IES, the fraction of retirees
buying annuities quickly decreases as life becomes more valuable. Moreover, when other
common impediments to annuitization are present, the demand for annuities is nearly
eliminated for values of VSL which are positive but not necessarily very large.
We can rephrase our findings in two ways. First, the well-known annuity puzzle can be
at least partially explained by a combination of two factors: i) the value of life is positive
and sufficiently large, ii) people are more averse to risk than to intertemporal fluctuations.
Second, the annuity puzzle provides evidence that people prefer early resolution of
uncertainty, i.e., that risk aversion is above the inverse of the IES. This is because when life
is valuable, early resolution of uncertainty must be preferred in order to account for this
puzzle.
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